Wilhelm, Waldersee and the Boxer Rebellion’, in Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (eds), The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II’s role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 0-521-82408-7, pp.91-118. Sean McMeekin: History never repeats itself in exactly the same way. I see the appeal of these analogies -- that China is Germany. But, of course, China could equally well be Russia in 1914. The Russian economy was growing at a rate of about 9 percent a year in 1914. In fact, in many ways, Russia on the eve of World War I was a far better analogy for China today. Supposedly, even if you believe the traditional historiography the whole problem is the growth of Russian power and that was what was actually destabilizing Europe -- not the growth of German power. So, sometimes even when we try to learn from history, we draw the wrong analogies and the wrong lessons.

the long controversy around the question, why did the war break out in the first place? Over the next four weeks, some renowned historians will share their research and analysis with you. And you’ll discover the devastating impact of the war on individuals and on whole societies. While this might seem like a sobering learning experience, it’s also a moving story that’s lost none of its fascination more than a century after it began. Historians of the Great War found themselves in high demand in 2014. The looming anniversary naturally prompted publishers to commission titles that were designed to make a splash, cause debate, and spark public interest. The market was consequently flooded with publications that attempted to explain why war had broken out in 1914. Few could have predicted, however, the full extent of public and media interest in World War I. Nor could one have expected that the question of the origins of the war, in particular, would once again be paramount and the subject of widespread, heated debate. It seems to me that the problem with the blame-centred approach is not so much that you might end up blaming the wrong party because frankly now a hundred years later, as you say, it doesn’t matter who we blame, politically it doesn’t make any difference. The real danger is that you end up deciding who you think is the culprit – you know bringing in the suspect and then constructing a charge sheet against that suspect in prosecutorial manner which is exactly what Fritz Fischer did. The problem is that that’s such a narrow approach. What we really need to understand is how did this war come about? Once we understand how the war came about, then we can ask questions about why it came about and because of whom; and we need to ask how first and allow the why and who questions to arise out of the how answers, rather than the other way around. Mombauer studied history at the Westfälische-Wilhelms-Universität (University of Münster) in Münster, Germany, and at the University of Sussex, where she was awarded a D.Phil. in history in 1998. She joined the Open University staff in 1998 as lecturer in modern European history. In 2003, she also became a visiting fellow at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra, Australia. [1]The First World War: Inevitable, Avoidable, Improbable or Desirable? Recent Interpretations on War Guilt and the War’s Origins’, German History, vol. 25, No 1, 2007, pp.78-95 All upcoming public events are going ahead as planned and you can find more information on our events blog The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II’s role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (edited with Wilhelm Deist) Find out more about this book This interpretation went counter to my conviction that Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s decision-makers had deliberately provoked a crisis, using the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as a pretext. To me, the evidence was clear. They were willing to risk escalating a localised war with Serbia (whom they suspected to have been behind the assassination), knowing that this could bring Russia, France and Britain into the conflict.

The goal of German and Austrian diplomats following the Sarajevo incident was to try to localize a conflict in the Balkans. Now, this may have been unrealistic, but the ideal scenario in both Berlin and Vienna was for Austria-Hungary to be able to confront Serbia without the other powers intervening. Russia's own policy or position, of course, was to continentalize the crisis and then the conflict. To make sure that France would get involved, and also Britain. To make sure that if it came to war, Britain and France would fight on their side. So, in this sense, turning it into a European and world conflagration was actually Russia's policy. That is not to say that Russia bears sole responsibility either. That is to say, it was the combination of the Austro-German response to Sarajevo and then the Russian response to the Austrian move against Serbia. This is what produced the Great War. Together these MOOCs have attracted more than 30,000 global learners so far. Meanwhile, courses and articles I have written on this topic on OpenLearn, The Open University’s free online learning platform, have reached more than 270,000 people in 176 countries.Can you talk a little bit about what sort of evidence there is to make that point – for example in December 1912, the infamous war council about which you in particular have written a lot. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about why this is an important event? Der hundertjährige Krieg um die Kriegsschuldfrage', in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 65, 5/6 2014, pp.303-337 This book is a unique collection of diplomatic and military documents for the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War. It brings together newly-discovered documents as well as many not previously available in English, drawn from a broad range of sources and countries. It is an essential collection for anyone studying the origins of the First World War. Annika Mombauer's essential source reader translates, cross-references and annotates a vast range of international diplomatic and military documents on the origins of the First World War. It collects together documents which are newly discovered or were not previously available in English, drawn from a broad range of sources and countries into a single, indispensible text for students and scholars alike. What stands out from Mombauer’s discussion is just how policy-relevant is the discussion on the origins the First World War. The debate on who started the war was, indeed still is, of critical importance if one wants to understand the future course of European history. In particular, there is the question of Germany – a key focus of Mombauer’s study. If Germany wanted to evade the Versailles settlement after 1918, she needed to avoid the charge of having planned an aggressive war in 1914. After 1945, if she wanted to avoid the charge of continuity in German history stretching from the Kaiser to Hitler, drawing a distinction between the accidental war in 1914 and the war planned by Hitler in 1939 was even more crucial. In the context of this argument on German foreign policy, the writing of German history moved centre-stage and Mombauer sets out to show how Clio was deceived in the years after 1918 and, for while, after 1945.