By the early 1980s many figures were being quoted for the overall risk to the shuttle, with estimates of a catastrophic failure ranging from less than 1 chance in 100 to 1 chance in 100 000. “The higher figures [1 in 100] come from working engineers, and the very low figures [1 in 100 000] from management,” wrote physicist Richard P. Feynman in his appendix “Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle” to the 1986 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. As another incentive for the military to use the shuttle, Congress reportedly told DoD that it would not pay for any satellites not designed to fit into the shuttle cargo bay. [6] Although NRO did not redesign existing satellites for the shuttle, the vehicle retained the ability to retrieve large cargos such as the KH-9 HEXAGON from orbit for refurbishment, and the agency studied resupplying the satellite in space. [7]

Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering

Although the FMEA/CIL was first viewed as a design tool, NASA now uses it during operations and management as well, to analyze problems, assess whether corrective actions are effective, identify where and when inspection an d maintenance are needed, and reveal trends in failures. When funding for the program came into question, there were concerns that the project might be canceled. This led to an effort to interest the US Air Force in using the shuttle for their missions as well. The Air Force was mildly interested but demanded a much larger vehicle, far larger than the original concepts, which NASA accepted since it was also beneficial to their own plans. To lower the development costs of the resulting designs, boosters were added, a throw-away fuel tank was adopted, and many other changes were made that greatly lowered the reusability and greatly added to the vehicle and operational costs. With the Air Force's assistance, the system emerged in its operational form. STARSHIP - SUPER HEAVY | SpaceX Starship Booster and Orbital Launch Mount | SpaceX Starship & Super Heavy | Plastic Display ModelDespite the potential benefits for the Air Force, the military was satisfied with its expendable boosters and did not need or want the shuttle as much as NASA did. Because the space agency needed outside support, the Defense Department (DoD) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) gained primary control over the design process. For example, NASA planned a 40-by-12-foot (12.2 by 3.7m) cargo bay, but NRO specified a 60-by-15-foot (18.3 by 4.6m) bay because it expected future intelligence satellites to become larger. When Faget again proposed a 12ft (3.7m) wide payload bay, the military almost immediately insisted on retaining the 15ft (4.6m) width. The Air Force also gained the equivalent of the use of one of the shuttles for free despite not paying for the shuttle's development or construction. In exchange for the NASA concessions, the Air Force testified to the Senate Space Committee on the shuttle's behalf in March 1971. [4] :216,232–234 [5] As for painting, I chose not to paint it since I knew that it would look worse if I did the paint job. If you chose to paint it, I would recommend finding a non-water based spray paint since soggy models don't look nice. Initially, the orbiter was to carry its own liquid propellant. However, studies showed carrying the propellant in an external tank allowed a larger payload bay in an otherwise much smaller craft. It also meant throwing away the tank after each launch, but this was a relatively small portion of operating costs.

LEGO NASA 10283 Space Shuttle Discovery Set for Adults

My 1:78 scale model of the NASA Space Shuttle made completely out of recycled materials that can be found in a typical household (although my family is far from that...). Another decision was the size of the crew. Some said that the shuttle should not carry more than four, the most that could use ejection seats. A commander, pilot, mission specialist, and payload specialist were sufficient for any mission. NASA expected to carry more space flight participants as payload specialists, so designed the vehicle to carry more. [2] The NRC committee had several criticisms. In practice, the FMEA was the sole basis for some engineering change decisions and all engineering waivers and rationales for re taining certain high-risk design features. However, the NRC report noted, hazard analyses for some important, high-risk subsystems “were not updated for years at a time even though design changes had occurred or dangerous failures were experienced.” On one procedural flow chart, the report noted, “the ‘Hazard Analysis As Required ’ is a dead-end box with inputs but no output with respect to waiver approval decisions.” NASA documents show that the airline vision also applied to risk. For example, in the 1969 NASA Space Shuttle Task Group Report, the authors wrote: “It is desirable that the vehicle configuration provide for crew/passenger safety in a manner and to the degree as provided in present day commercial jet aircraft.” The probabilities originated in a series of quantitative risk assessments NASA was required to conduct by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP), in anticipation of the launch of the Galileo spacecraft on its voyage to Jupiter, originally scheduled for the early 1980s. Galileo was powered by a plutonium-­fueled radioisotope thermoelectric generator, and Presidential Directive/NSC-25 ruled that either the U.S. President or the director of the office of science and technology policy must examine the safety of any launch of nuclear material before approving it. The INSRP (which consisted of representatives of NASA as the launching agency, the Department of Energy, which manages nuclear devices, and the Department of Defense, whose Air Force manages range safety at launch) was charged with ascertaining the quantitative risks of a catastrophic launch dispersing the radioactive poison into the atmosphere. There were a number of studies because the upper stage for boosting Galileo into interplanetary space was reconfigured several times.

One reason NASA has so strongly resisted probabilistic risk analysis may be the fact that “PRA runs against all traditions of engineering, where you handle reliability by safety factors,” said Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, associate professor in the department of industrial engineering and engineering management at Stanford University in California, who is now studying organizational factors and risk assessment in NASA. In addition, with NASA’s strong pride in design, PRA may be “perceived as an insult to their capabilities, that the system they ’ve designed is not 100 percent perfect and absolutely safe,” she added. Thus, the character of an organization influences the reliability and failure of the systems it builds because its structure, policy, and culture determine the priorities, incentives, and communication paths for the engineers and managers doing the work, she said. A great project to do if you are interested in stretching the limits of your abilities and learning new or honing your skills. Wade, Mark. "Shuttle". Astronautix.com. Archived from the original on July 12, 2016 . Retrieved November 12, 2017. All of this was taking place in the midst of other NASA teams proposing a wide variety of post-Apollo missions, a number of which would cost as much as Apollo or more [ citation needed]. As each of these projects fought for funding, the NASA budget was at the same time being severely constrained. Three were eventually presented to Vice President Agnew in 1969. The shuttle project rose to the top, largely due to tireless campaigning by its supporters [ citation needed]. By 1970 the shuttle had been selected as the one major project for the short-term post-Apollo time frame.