Vermeij GJ (2006) Historical contingency and the purported uniqueness of evolutionary innovations. Proceedings Nation Al Academy Sci United States of America 103(6):1804–1809

Powell R (2007) Is Convergence more than an analogy? homoplasy and its implications for macroevolutionary predictability. Biol Philos 22:565–578 a b Fitch, Walter M. (2012). The Three Failures of Creationism: Logic, Rhetoric, and Science. University of California Press. pp.157–158. ISBN 978-0-520-95166-2. Two points are worth making regarding this strategy. First, although these moves generate explanations by unifying different species into a shared (if abstract) evolutionary trajectory or set of affordances, the unity at work is not a broad ‘super-empirical’ virtue that one might use to decide between competing explanations (Churchland 1985; Kitcher 1981, 1989). Instead, the strategy attempts to highlight deep causal regularities between evolving systems and environments, with abstraction facilitating the identification and evidencing of such regularities (Strevens 2008). Second, the two evolutionary similarity criteria identify different kinds of regularities and thus establish different kinds of uniqueness attributions. They do so in part because the contrast classes are established using different kinds of similarity.The crocodile winked one eye as the elephant’s child came closer. He put his head down close to the crocodile’s musky, tusky mouth and the crocodile caught him by his little nose and said between his teeth “I think today I will begin with an elephant’s child”. Not shared by any other event, apart from spatiotemporal location and self identity (or it is unknowable whether they are shared by other events). Or One fine morning in the middle of the Precession of the Equinoxes this ‘satiable Elephant’s Child asked a new fine question that he had never asked before. He asked, ‘What does the Crocodile have for dinner?’ Then everybody said, ‘Hush!’ in a loud and dretful tone, and they spanked him immediately and directly, without stopping, for a long time.

H. W. Boynton, writing in The Atlantic in 1903, commented that only a century earlier children had had to be content with the Bible, Pilgrim's Progress, Paradise Lost, and Foxe's Book of Martyrs, but in his day "a much pleasanter bill of fare is being provided for them". Boynton argued that with Just So Stories, Kipling did for "very little children" what The Jungle Book had done for older ones. He described the book as "artfully artless, in its themes, in its repetitions, in its habitual limitation, and occasional abeyance, of adult humor. It strikes a child as the kind of yarn his father or uncle might have spun if he had just happened to think of it; and it has, like all good fairy-business, a sound core of philosophy". [12] Modern [ edit ] Emery NJ (2006) Cognitive ornithology: the evolution of avian intelligence. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 361:23–43 The stories, first published in 1902, are origin stories, fantastic accounts of how various features of animals came to be. [4] A forerunner of these stories is Kipling's "How Fear Came", in The Second Jungle Book (1895). In it, Mowgli hears the story of how the tiger got his stripes. Brown P, Sutikna T, Morwood MJ, Soejono RP, Saptomo EW, Due RA (2004) A new small-bodied hominin from the Late Pleistocene of Flores. Indonesia Nature 431(7012):1055McConwell AK (2019) Contingency’s causality and structural diversity. Biol Philos 34:26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9679-x Walsh, Sue (September 2007). "Kipling's Children and the Category of 'Children's Literature' ". The Kipling Society . Retrieved 27 October 2016. Turner DD (2004) The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism. Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A, 35(1), 1–17.