In post-conflict fragile states like Somalia, development is a slow marathon which is not about winning the race but getting people to run alongside. Every society is complex and unique. There are no perfect conditions for development implementation and we must deliver results to people who are suffering today. Klimatafel von Chisimaio (Kismayu) / Somalia" (PDF). Baseline climate means (1961–1990) from stations all over the world (in German). Deutscher Wetterdienst . Retrieved 24 October 2016.

Long term mean monthly sunshine fraction in Somalia". Food and Agriculture Organization. Archived from the original on 2016-10-05 . Retrieved 4 November 2016. According to most scholars, the ancient Land of Punt and its native inhabitants formed part of the ethnogenesis of the Somali people. This ancient historical kingdom is where a great portion of their cultural traditions and ancestry are said to derive from. [47] [48] [49] [50] Somalis share many historical and cultural traits with other Cushitic peoples, especially with Lowland East Cushitic people, specifically the Afar and the Saho. [51]Mohamud Omar Ali; Koss Mohammed; Michael Walls. "Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building" (PDF). Academy for Peace and Development. p.12 . Retrieved 2 June 2017. On 18 May 1991 at this second national meeting, the Somali National Movement Central Committee, with the support of a meeting of elders representing the major clans in the Northern Regions, declared the restoration of the Republic of Somaliland, covering the same area as that of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. The Burao conference also established a government for the Republic

According to a trade journal published in 1856, Berbera was described as “the freest port in the world, and the most important trading place on the whole Arabian Gulf.”: Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Africa. Edinburgh University Press. 8 September 2016. ISBN 978-1-4744-1491-3.Lowell Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, (University of Michigan Press: 2006), p.115 In October 2021, the Somaliland administration expelled en masse an important group of several hundred traders from Las Anod. The traders were from a clan that mostly lives in southern Somalia called the Rahanweyn, who have in the past been vilified as Al-Shabaab collaborators. Again, whilst evidence is scarce, rumour is plentiful. The Rahanweyn were an important business community in Las Anod and some Dhulbahante interpreted their expulsion as an attempt by Somaliland to undermine the growing economic power of Las Anod and scapegoat them for the killings. This is consistent with the narrative that the assassinations were also intended to scare off diaspora investors and prevent the town becoming a rising business hub. However, there is another narrative that Dhulbahante traders were being outcompeted, and themselves orchestrated the deportations. Somalia has an unenviable record as a failed state. Its twenty-year civil war has brought lawlessness and chaos at a massive human cost: one million Somalis are believed to have died; another 750,000 Somalis are currently seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Last year alone, as the effects of drought, conflict and famine took hold across southern Somalia, it is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people died; half of that number were probably children. The other version of “Weapons of Mass Migration” that are being deployed in the Horn of Africa is the Western-originated strategy to prompt a large-scale outflow of “refugees” from Eritrea. The domestic push factor of the policy of indefinite military service mixed with the pull factor of the EU’s 91-93% acceptance rate of Eritrean “refugees” has created such a massive demographic crisis for the country that 400,000 of its slightly more than 6 million total citizens have already left over the past six years. The effect has been to weaken the economic, military, and social strength of the country with the anticipation of prompting a political crisis in the coming future, the effect of which might be a lot more unpredictable and far-reaching than what the West might expect to be a simple Rose Revolution-esque regime change operation. More than likely and owing to the specific domestic and regional circumstances that Eritrea presently finds itself in, a concerted anti-government movement within the country (whether composed of Color Revolution ‘protesters’ and/or Hybrid War ‘rebels’) might lead to the total collapse of the government, which itself could unleash a swarm of refugees to Ethiopia and Europe and possibly even elicit a militarized response from rival Addis Ababa. Main articles: History of Somalia, History of Somaliland, and Maritime history of Somalia Ruins of the Adal Sultanate in Zeila, a kingdom led in the 16th century by Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (Ahmed Gurey).

This is a list of the extreme points of Somalia, the points that are farther north, south, east or west than any other location.

The Shifta War 1963–1967

Peter John de la Fosse Wiles, The New Communist Third World: an essay in political economy, (Taylor & Francis: 1982), p.279. The Observer (1962). "Time Bomb in Africa". Muslimnews International. 1–2: 276 . Retrieved 2 April 2013. a b International Demographic Data Center (U.S.), United States Bureau of the Census (1980). World Population 1979: Recent Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World. The Bureau. pp. 137-138. Politically, there is also a real opportunity to help support a broader, more inclusive political process when the mandate of the Transitional Federal Institutions expires in August. Somalia’s government is committed to ensuring progress, as are Somalia’s regional leaders. Metz, Helen C., ed. (1992), "Coup d'Etat", Somalia: A Country Study , Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress , retrieved October 21, 2009 .