Regardless of which metaphysical account of questions we adopt, we can introduce some basic features of questions and answers. Consider the following example questions: A.: My best friend always tells me when you get brought up in a conversation that she thinks it was true love. She thinks you're the only person I've ever loved in my life. And to tell you the truth, I think she is right. No one makes me feel how you made me feel, babe. No one has made me smile like you did. No one makes me giggle after crying like you did. No one can ever kiss me the way you did, and always catch me off guard. And fight me when I didn't kiss you in front of my friends, which I warmed up too after a while. You were a jerk to me at times, but I was also a witch to you. So I guess you could say it evens out, right? What exactly are questions? There is no general agreement on the metaphysics of questions and fortunately, exactly what questions are need not concern us. I will follow Friedman in assuming that questions are not propositions (Friedman, 2013, 150). Some take questions to be sets of propositions, where the set of propositions consists of all the possible answers to the question. Others take questions to be open propositions. Footnote 16

Following Friedman, let us say that a question Q is sound at world w iff there is a proposition that truly and completely answers Q at w (Friedman, 2013, 151). Henceforth I will introduce the following notation: I will reserve uppercase italicized letters to denote questions and lowercase italicized letters to denote propositions. Where Q is a question and a is a proposition, I will use the notation ‘ Q(a)’ to denote a true, complete answer to Q. I'm stretching out of reach, but you're just out too far. I've got my arms wide open, waiting for that hug you promised me before you'd leave. I'm still waiting for Friday to happen, the day you were supposed to see me before you moved. I'll always be waiting for more memories to make. If (EGGS) is now true or (EGGS) is now false, then whether Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow is now inevitable. It wasn't long before We were called in,after asking a few questions regarding why we were opting for an early scan, the sonographer typed "maternal reassurance"as the reason. So We began, the flat screen mounted on the wall right in front of us, we waited anxiously to see our baby forthe first time.But those thoughts made me realize I never think of you when I’m busy or laughing. I never hear a joke and think how much I’d love to share it with you. I never go out with my friends and wish you were there for me to dance with. I never want to text you when something good happens. This approach rejects bivalence for future contingents and also the Law of Excluded Middle which states that for every proposition, p, either p or not- p. This approach introduces a third truth-value that I will call middle. Future contingents like (EGGS) and (NA24) are neither true nor false, but rather middle. Assigning an intermediate truth-value to such claims is intended to capture the idea that such statements are “at the present time determined neither positively or negatively” (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53). So the Middlist rejects Premise (1) of the above argument. The lesson to be learned from future contingents is that they are neither true nor false but instead possess an intermediate truth-value. There is a part of my life I said I would never write about in a blog. I can write about good things and bad, but not this. This is sacred. This is about the biggest heartbreak I have ever had. Every time I have tried to express my thoughts on this subject, my fingers get weak and freeze. My eyes well up with tears. I wanted to write this as a tribute to the child that I lost. He existed. He was real. He is not something to hide or to be ashamed of. He was mine. And he had a name. Gummy. The Middlist might respond that she is in a better position to respond to this difficulty than the Falsist. There are two general strategies that the Middlist might adopt in response. The first is to claim that when a true, complete answer to Q is ‘a’ is middle, it is still appropriate to wonder whether Q and so (WIN1) needs to be revised: there are cases where one knows the true, complete answer to Q, yet it is still appropriate to wonder whether Q. It is precisely the nature of a proposition being middle that makes it indeterminate and thereby appropriate to wonder about the corresponding question. The second strategy is to claim that knowing that ‘a’ is middle does not involve knowing Q’s true, complete answer. This strategy does not need to reject or revise (WIN1) since learning that a proposition is middle does not involve learning a question’s true, complete answer.

Cariani, F. (2021). The modal future: A theory of future-directed thought and talk. Cambridge University Press

I’m Not Ready for Life Without My Mom

Falsism seems to offer a therapy. In accepting the theory, I come to know that (NA24) is false. Falsism provides the true, complete answer to the question N. The true, complete answer is that It is false that the sodium-24 atom will decay within the next 24 h. So, according to (WIN1) it is inappropriate for me to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay. Footnote 22 But I do continue to wonder, and my wondering certainly seems appropriate. This raises a problem for Falsism. Footnote 23 I will always wonder, who you would, have been, child baby loss, memorial quote, svg cut files, in memory children, sympathy heaven, brother family son, sister daughter, goodbyes miscarriage, religious angel, sorrow remembrance

In addition to Thomason, I include Macfarlane ( 2003, 2008, 2014) under this label even though he adopts a Relativist account of future contingents. The reason I include him under the label of Supervaluationism for the purposes of this discussion is because the question we are considering is whether it is appropriate to wonder about a future contingent before the occurrence of the event described by the future contingent. Macfarlane’s account relativizes truth of future contingents to a context of use and a context of assessment. The truth-value of a statement about the future is arrived at by supervaluating over all histories that include the context of use and the context of assessment. When the context of assessment coincides with the context of use, the truth-conditions for an utterance will be the same as the Supervaluationist truth-conditions, and so, to the extent that I think that Supervaluationism faces a problem regarding wondering about future contingents at the context of use, these problems apply equally to MacFarlane’s account. Making truth of future contingents relative to context of use and context of assessment is intended to accommodate retrospective accuracy judgments: judgments after the event described in the utterance has occurred. Miscarriage isstill not talked about much. I can't help but think that part of the reason for this is because women feel they are not allowed or meant to be upset about it. " Belnap, N., & Green, M. (1994). Indeterminism and the thin red line. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 365–388. Part of me will always wonder if it was just me, if it was all my head, if whatever we had was nothing but my imagination or a dream that felt so real. Part of me will always wonder what happened to you, why you turned into someone you’re not, why you brutally rejected someone’s love and why you stopped yourself from falling. Maybe I could’ve been everything you were looking for. Thankfully, I went on to have 2 more beautiful, healthy children. Little did I know that my miscarriage was just the beginning of a very difficult journey. I could write a book on the struggle and turmoil that would be the next part of my efforts to expand my family! But it was all so very worth it.

6 Things You Can Do Now to Help Kids Remember Their Grandparents

My husband and I were so excited about this baby. It was our first child together (I had a daughter from a previous marriage) and he really wanted kids. He asked me on the first date multiple times if I wanted kids! And I was excited to finally give my then 5-year-old a sibling and to have a child with the man I loved. If we accept (WIN1) and we accept Falsism, then it follows that wondering about future contingents is inappropriate; we ought not wonder about them. To raise the stakes, suppose that an evil scientist tells me that he will torture me horribly for 5 days iff (NA24) is true and send me on a wonderful 5-days holiday iff (NA24) is false. Such a predicament would concern me greatly. I would undoubtedly lie awake at night wondering whether (NA24) is true or false. I would hope that it is false and fear that it is true. On the current framework, the question that serves as the content of my wondering is Will the sodium-24 atom decay in the next 24 h? Let us call this question ‘ N’. I knew in these moments that grieving the loss of our daughter would be soul-crushing, but I had to make it home to our three babies and my husband. I had to. Questions have possible answers where answers can be understood as propositions. Footnote 17 So the following are all possible answers to A: a.: Necessarily, if Q is a question pertaining to time t2 and one knows at t1 a true, complete answer-at- t2 to Q, then one ought not wonder at t1 whether Q. Footnote 41

It’s always easier to miss someone in the middle of the night when you’re lonely than it is to miss someone in the middle of the day when you’re busy. And I think that says a lot. Thomason, R. H. (1984). Combinations of tense and modality. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic: Extensions of classical logic (Vol. II, pp. 135–165). Springer.

Supporting the Grievers in the Aftermath of Suicide

J. (1930). Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of propositional logic. In S. McCall (Ed.), Polish logic 1920–1939 (1967, pp. 40–65). Oxford: Clarendon Press. That’s not me, that’s not who I am and I don’t think that’s who I will ever be. At least not now, not when I met you.